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Tunisia Terrorism - It's time to get tough


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jamiemartin721 Flag Reading 02 Jul 15 9.17am

Quote suicideatselhurst at 02 Jul 2015 12.30am

Quote Stirlingsays at 02 Jul 2015 12.10am

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 10.50am

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 10.01am

Both the previous posts are showing a little naivety I believe.
We are dealing with totally ruthless fanatics. The rule of law protects the individual in many cases but part of our civil liberties is to be safe from harm.

Make no mistake, this is an us or them situation and like in most conflicts, what is fair will come second to what wins. If people start dying in numbers in Britain, the gloves will be off if they are not already.

Its a threat, but in terms of a real threat to national security, stability of the nation and the British way of life its fairly minimal. Its a serious matter, and one we need to remain focused on, but if we keep wetting our knickers in any conflict when the enemy causes casualties, civilian or military, we're only going to end up losing.

We're in a war, and its inevitable that people will die, that cannot be avoided. Acting as if its 1939, the Army is in retreat and the Germans are at the door, every time we suffer an attack ultimately will end up feeding into a defeat. Turning every casualty into a media story hampered the long term ambitions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the same will apply to the war on terror.

We need to eliminate the threat, definitely, but in doing so, we will also have to accept that threat will now exist for at least another generation. The successes against Al-Qaeda groups has produced groups like IS, that have effectively formed a 'second generation' of Islamist terrorists aimed at the west.

Terrorist groups invariably see themselves as a vanguard movement, their aim is to create reprisals and repression of those they claim to represent, marginalizing those people, and drawing them onto their side of the fence (ultimately radicalizing them).

Its a long war situation, there isn't an easy way out, because even if we crushed IS militarily in Syria and Iraq, their affilates and ideological supporters have essentially become the new Al-Qaeda franchise.

Eventually IS will likely end up destroyed, and its survivors will form a new organization that will declare war on the west and so on.

Usually these kinds of conflicts run to 20-30 years before either petering out, negotiated settlements or being overtaken by social changes (or a combination of all these).

Each generation of terrorist group becomes more efficient and effective than its predecessor, as it learns from its failures.


I think you both make good points.

Jamie's point about media outcries over casualties speaks of a cultural mindset of western democracies which have avoided large scale conflicts for over fifty years.

There is a touch of the demise of the Roman empire about it, where the longer Rome went without a real external threat the more distant it became from even recognizing when it needed to fight to protect its interests.

To sum it up simplistically, in the end Rome fell because it forgot what it took to remain a superpower......Essentially this has been repeated throughout history since.

I see the way the western media deal with conflict as a small reminder of this......They see it through the eyes of people who have forgotten that all they have....All the privilege they take for granted....Was ultimately won by people who died violently in the dirt.

Ultimately, it always comes down to that.....As is the nature of cellular life.....As is the nature of man.


Yes stirling both make good points but i take issue with jamies point above, every casulty is a story and we need to remember them and why they became a casulty..if we remember that maybe we wont have to keep going into conflict

After war is done, we should mourn the dead and tell their stories, so that their sacrifice can live on. But if we'd told the individual stories of the Blitz and Dunkirk and focused on the tragedy. As Stalin said, the loss of one is a tragedy, the loss of millions a statistic. If we grieve for each person lost, we'd never get from our beds.

Its why the US lost in Vietnam, because the reality of the war back home, was about 55,000 dead Americans, not military gains. Had that 'not taken hold' the US might well have ground the NVA and VC et al to a stalemate following the Tet Offensive.


 


"One Nation Under God, has turned into One Nation Under the Influence of One Drug"
[Link]

TheJudge Flag 02 Jul 15 11.33am

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 10.57pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 9.07pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 4.38pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 4.24pm
Most of what you say is generally reasonable but I would remind you that the IRA nearly killed the entire Cabinet and there were not really many active IRA members. A similar action would constitute a serious threat to national security I would suggest.

They didn't nearly kill the entire cabinet, they managed to bomb the Brighton Hotel and launch a rocket attack on Downing Street. Neither attack would likely have resulted in the loss of the entire cabinet, and civil contingencies exist that can deal with that event anyhow.

The number of active IRA members, doesn't really describe the effectiveness or size of the organization. The Provisionals generally had very few active service units in operation at any given time. Those cells would carry out attacks and bombings, but they were supported by other cells that dealt with this like logistical support, intelligence, counter intelligence, operational planning etc that all would then be fed to an ASU. Someone would build the bomb, another group would move it from the bomb maker to the armoury, another group would then supply it to the ASU would would deploy it, and then another group would have set up 'escape plans' for the ASU (and many of these groups would have little or no interaction) - It makes the most of skill sets and allows focused training (and in theory makes it harder to infiltrate)

So you might have three active service units on the mainland, of say 15 people in total, but they would be backed by a much larger organization.


As such an ASU was only focused on conducting the operation. Most militaries work this way, there are those that 'engage the enemy' and those who 'make it possible'.


Sounds like you wouldn't get twitchy until the IS flag was flying over Parliament. Glad you're not in charge.

Not really, I like to understand how things work and operate. I think its vital to understand an enemy, who it is, what it wants, how it functions etc if you want to defeat it. This isn't a conflict that can be won purely on a militarily basis.



No war is won by military action alone. It requires a capacity to know what the enemy is thinking and intelligence on their capabilities. It is also a psychological battle. No one should doubt that.

 

jamiemartin721 Flag Reading 02 Jul 15 12.00pm

Quote TheJudge at 02 Jul 2015 11.33am

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 10.57pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 9.07pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 4.38pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 4.24pm
Most of what you say is generally reasonable but I would remind you that the IRA nearly killed the entire Cabinet and there were not really many active IRA members. A similar action would constitute a serious threat to national security I would suggest.

They didn't nearly kill the entire cabinet, they managed to bomb the Brighton Hotel and launch a rocket attack on Downing Street. Neither attack would likely have resulted in the loss of the entire cabinet, and civil contingencies exist that can deal with that event anyhow.

The number of active IRA members, doesn't really describe the effectiveness or size of the organization. The Provisionals generally had very few active service units in operation at any given time. Those cells would carry out attacks and bombings, but they were supported by other cells that dealt with this like logistical support, intelligence, counter intelligence, operational planning etc that all would then be fed to an ASU. Someone would build the bomb, another group would move it from the bomb maker to the armoury, another group would then supply it to the ASU would would deploy it, and then another group would have set up 'escape plans' for the ASU (and many of these groups would have little or no interaction) - It makes the most of skill sets and allows focused training (and in theory makes it harder to infiltrate)

So you might have three active service units on the mainland, of say 15 people in total, but they would be backed by a much larger organization.


As such an ASU was only focused on conducting the operation. Most militaries work this way, there are those that 'engage the enemy' and those who 'make it possible'.


Sounds like you wouldn't get twitchy until the IS flag was flying over Parliament. Glad you're not in charge.

Not really, I like to understand how things work and operate. I think its vital to understand an enemy, who it is, what it wants, how it functions etc if you want to defeat it. This isn't a conflict that can be won purely on a militarily basis.



No war is won by military action alone. It requires a capacity to know what the enemy is thinking and intelligence on their capabilities. It is also a psychological battle. No one should doubt that.

Military, psychological, ideological, sociological and economic. The best way to defeat an enemy is to deprive it of its capacity to fight and then its will to fight.

Interestingly one of the core foundations of ISIS (at least in Iraq) is the accumulation of a significant portion of the Sons of Iraq, who prior to the US pull out, were operating as a paid support force alongside the US troops. Many of these 'Sons' had prior Iraqi military and Police experience, and were previously involved with the anti-US Insurgency, but they also were fairly well paid by the US and turned out to be effective if somewhat unwilling allies. The US paid better than AL-Qaeda, and the Sons knew who was allied with which factions.

In 2009 the US passed all responsibility over to the Iraqi government, who promptly ceased paying the Sons of Iraqi, rendering them unemployed, and so they ended up signing up with Insurgent groups and Sunni Militias again.

Then when the Syria civil war began, the Iraqi insurgents and Sunni Militias began supplying the Sunni groups across the border with weapons and training, and as things grew they became more directly involved notably with the group that would become ISIS as it paid well, and had objectives that suited the outcomes sought by Sunni Nationalists.

Consequently, ISIS rapidly gained access to a well trained (ex-Iraqi military, police and intelligence) force of about 15,000 or so experienced insurgents, that were well organized inside Iraq, and well established at fighting a guerilla war - allowing ISIS to tip the balance across the border regions in their favour.

It also gave the capacity to IS to understand the weaknesses of the existing Iraqi army, and rout it quickly and effectively (as the Sons had been engaged against the Iraqi military for some time, and been collecting intelligence on it).

 


"One Nation Under God, has turned into One Nation Under the Influence of One Drug"
[Link]

leggedstruggle Flag Croydon 02 Jul 15 1.45pm

kill them

 


mother-in-law is an anagram of woman hitler

Sedlescombe Flag Sedlescombe 02 Jul 15 1.48pm

Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 1.45pm

kill them


Kill someone, anyone. Then we can comfort ourselves that something is being done

 

leggedstruggle Flag Croydon 02 Jul 15 2.21pm

Quote Sedlescombe at 02 Jul 2015 1.48pm

Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 1.45pm

kill them


Kill someone, anyone. Then we can comfort ourselves that something is being done

ok, we could appeal to their better nature instead.

 


mother-in-law is an anagram of woman hitler

jamiemartin721 Flag Reading 02 Jul 15 4.01pm

Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 1.45pm

kill them

The voices in your head?


 


"One Nation Under God, has turned into One Nation Under the Influence of One Drug"
[Link]

Jacey Flag 02 Jul 15 4.23pm

Just a suggestion, but do you think the prospect of our 6 RAF jets will cause ISIL to quake in their boots, if we eventually agree to attack them in Syria, after the summer hols!!

 

leggedstruggle Flag Croydon 02 Jul 15 4.46pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 4.01pm

Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 1.45pm

kill them

The voices in your head?


As opposed to the Boy's own Guide to Postmodern Philosophy that appears to be in yours?

 


mother-in-law is an anagram of woman hitler

TheJudge Flag 02 Jul 15 5.44pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 12.00pm

Quote TheJudge at 02 Jul 2015 11.33am

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 10.57pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 9.07pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 4.38pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 4.24pm
Most of what you say is generally reasonable but I would remind you that the IRA nearly killed the entire Cabinet and there were not really many active IRA members. A similar action would constitute a serious threat to national security I would suggest.

They didn't nearly kill the entire cabinet, they managed to bomb the Brighton Hotel and launch a rocket attack on Downing Street. Neither attack would likely have resulted in the loss of the entire cabinet, and civil contingencies exist that can deal with that event anyhow.

The number of active IRA members, doesn't really describe the effectiveness or size of the organization. The Provisionals generally had very few active service units in operation at any given time. Those cells would carry out attacks and bombings, but they were supported by other cells that dealt with this like logistical support, intelligence, counter intelligence, operational planning etc that all would then be fed to an ASU. Someone would build the bomb, another group would move it from the bomb maker to the armoury, another group would then supply it to the ASU would would deploy it, and then another group would have set up 'escape plans' for the ASU (and many of these groups would have little or no interaction) - It makes the most of skill sets and allows focused training (and in theory makes it harder to infiltrate)

So you might have three active service units on the mainland, of say 15 people in total, but they would be backed by a much larger organization.


As such an ASU was only focused on conducting the operation. Most militaries work this way, there are those that 'engage the enemy' and those who 'make it possible'.


Sounds like you wouldn't get twitchy until the IS flag was flying over Parliament. Glad you're not in charge.

Not really, I like to understand how things work and operate. I think its vital to understand an enemy, who it is, what it wants, how it functions etc if you want to defeat it. This isn't a conflict that can be won purely on a militarily basis.



No war is won by military action alone. It requires a capacity to know what the enemy is thinking and intelligence on their capabilities. It is also a psychological battle. No one should doubt that.

Military, psychological, ideological, sociological and economic. The best way to defeat an enemy is to deprive it of its capacity to fight and then its will to fight.

Interestingly one of the core foundations of ISIS (at least in Iraq) is the accumulation of a significant portion of the Sons of Iraq, who prior to the US pull out, were operating as a paid support force alongside the US troops. Many of these 'Sons' had prior Iraqi military and Police experience, and were previously involved with the anti-US Insurgency, but they also were fairly well paid by the US and turned out to be effective if somewhat unwilling allies. The US paid better than AL-Qaeda, and the Sons knew who was allied with which factions.

In 2009 the US passed all responsibility over to the Iraqi government, who promptly ceased paying the Sons of Iraqi, rendering them unemployed, and so they ended up signing up with Insurgent groups and Sunni Militias again.

Then when the Syria civil war began, the Iraqi insurgents and Sunni Militias began supplying the Sunni groups across the border with weapons and training, and as things grew they became more directly involved notably with the group that would become ISIS as it paid well, and had objectives that suited the outcomes sought by Sunni Nationalists.

Consequently, ISIS rapidly gained access to a well trained (ex-Iraqi military, police and intelligence) force of about 15,000 or so experienced insurgents, that were well organized inside Iraq, and well established at fighting a guerilla war - allowing ISIS to tip the balance across the border regions in their favour.

It also gave the capacity to IS to understand the weaknesses of the existing Iraqi army, and rout it quickly and effectively (as the Sons had been engaged against the Iraqi military for some time, and been collecting intelligence on it).

Yes it's interesting how the complex webs that are weaved impact on the current situation. One is left wondering at which point between incompetence, design and the unpredictable these things sit.

 

legaleagle Flag 02 Jul 15 9.25pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 12.00pm

Quote TheJudge at 02 Jul 2015 11.33am

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 10.57pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 9.07pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 4.38pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 4.24pm
Most of what you say is generally reasonable but I would remind you that the IRA nearly killed the entire Cabinet and there were not really many active IRA members. A similar action would constitute a serious threat to national security I would suggest.

They didn't nearly kill the entire cabinet, they managed to bomb the Brighton Hotel and launch a rocket attack on Downing Street. Neither attack would likely have resulted in the loss of the entire cabinet, and civil contingencies exist that can deal with that event anyhow.

The number of active IRA members, doesn't really describe the effectiveness or size of the organization. The Provisionals generally had very few active service units in operation at any given time. Those cells would carry out attacks and bombings, but they were supported by other cells that dealt with this like logistical support, intelligence, counter intelligence, operational planning etc that all would then be fed to an ASU. Someone would build the bomb, another group would move it from the bomb maker to the armoury, another group would then supply it to the ASU would would deploy it, and then another group would have set up 'escape plans' for the ASU (and many of these groups would have little or no interaction) - It makes the most of skill sets and allows focused training (and in theory makes it harder to infiltrate)

So you might have three active service units on the mainland, of say 15 people in total, but they would be backed by a much larger organization.


As such an ASU was only focused on conducting the operation. Most militaries work this way, there are those that 'engage the enemy' and those who 'make it possible'.


Sounds like you wouldn't get twitchy until the IS flag was flying over Parliament. Glad you're not in charge.

Not really, I like to understand how things work and operate. I think its vital to understand an enemy, who it is, what it wants, how it functions etc if you want to defeat it. This isn't a conflict that can be won purely on a militarily basis.



No war is won by military action alone. It requires a capacity to know what the enemy is thinking and intelligence on their capabilities. It is also a psychological battle. No one should doubt that.

Military, psychological, ideological, sociological and economic. The best way to defeat an enemy is to deprive it of its capacity to fight and then its will to fight.

Interestingly one of the core foundations of ISIS (at least in Iraq) is the accumulation of a significant portion of the Sons of Iraq, who prior to the US pull out, were operating as a paid support force alongside the US troops. Many of these 'Sons' had prior Iraqi military and Police experience, and were previously involved with the anti-US Insurgency, but they also were fairly well paid by the US and turned out to be effective if somewhat unwilling allies. The US paid better than AL-Qaeda, and the Sons knew who was allied with which factions.

In 2009 the US passed all responsibility over to the Iraqi government, who promptly ceased paying the Sons of Iraqi, rendering them unemployed, and so they ended up signing up with Insurgent groups and Sunni Militias again.

Then when the Syria civil war began, the Iraqi insurgents and Sunni Militias began supplying the Sunni groups across the border with weapons and training, and as things grew they became more directly involved notably with the group that would become ISIS as it paid well, and had objectives that suited the outcomes sought by Sunni Nationalists.

Consequently, ISIS rapidly gained access to a well trained (ex-Iraqi military, police and intelligence) force of about 15,000 or so experienced insurgents, that were well organized inside Iraq, and well established at fighting a guerilla war - allowing ISIS to tip the balance across the border regions in their favour.

It also gave the capacity to IS to understand the weaknesses of the existing Iraqi army, and rout it quickly and effectively (as the Sons had been engaged against the Iraqi military for some time, and been collecting intelligence on it).


IMO an important part of the psychological aspect is winning "hears and minds" of those not actively engaged but who might become sympathetic or already are to some degree but not engaging in violence.

The failure to do so by the US/their S. Vietnamese allies (some would say puppets) was a pertinent factor in the way things went.Some felt the British did a better job in Malaya during the "emergency" and a pretty abysmal job in Kenya.There are those who think Bloody Sunday (and ensuing investigation) and Internment were disasters in terms of the broader big picture in unnecessarily alienating "hearts and minds".

 

leggedstruggle Flag Croydon 02 Jul 15 11.40pm

Quote legaleagle at 02 Jul 2015 9.25pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 12.00pm

Quote TheJudge at 02 Jul 2015 11.33am

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 10.57pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 9.07pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 4.38pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 4.24pm
Most of what you say is generally reasonable but I would remind you that the IRA nearly killed the entire Cabinet and there were not really many active IRA members. A similar action would constitute a serious threat to national security I would suggest.

They didn't nearly kill the entire cabinet, they managed to bomb the Brighton Hotel and launch a rocket attack on Downing Street. Neither attack would likely have resulted in the loss of the entire cabinet, and civil contingencies exist that can deal with that event anyhow.

The number of active IRA members, doesn't really describe the effectiveness or size of the organization. The Provisionals generally had very few active service units in operation at any given time. Those cells would carry out attacks and bombings, but they were supported by other cells that dealt with this like logistical support, intelligence, counter intelligence, operational planning etc that all would then be fed to an ASU. Someone would build the bomb, another group would move it from the bomb maker to the armoury, another group would then supply it to the ASU would would deploy it, and then another group would have set up 'escape plans' for the ASU (and many of these groups would have little or no interaction) - It makes the most of skill sets and allows focused training (and in theory makes it harder to infiltrate)

So you might have three active service units on the mainland, of say 15 people in total, but they would be backed by a much larger organization.


As such an ASU was only focused on conducting the operation. Most militaries work this way, there are those that 'engage the enemy' and those who 'make it possible'.


Sounds like you wouldn't get twitchy until the IS flag was flying over Parliament. Glad you're not in charge.

Not really, I like to understand how things work and operate. I think its vital to understand an enemy, who it is, what it wants, how it functions etc if you want to defeat it. This isn't a conflict that can be won purely on a militarily basis.



No war is won by military action alone. It requires a capacity to know what the enemy is thinking and intelligence on their capabilities. It is also a psychological battle. No one should doubt that.

Military, psychological, ideological, sociological and economic. The best way to defeat an enemy is to deprive it of its capacity to fight and then its will to fight.

Interestingly one of the core foundations of ISIS (at least in Iraq) is the accumulation of a significant portion of the Sons of Iraq, who prior to the US pull out, were operating as a paid support force alongside the US troops. Many of these 'Sons' had prior Iraqi military and Police experience, and were previously involved with the anti-US Insurgency, but they also were fairly well paid by the US and turned out to be effective if somewhat unwilling allies. The US paid better than AL-Qaeda, and the Sons knew who was allied with which factions.

In 2009 the US passed all responsibility over to the Iraqi government, who promptly ceased paying the Sons of Iraqi, rendering them unemployed, and so they ended up signing up with Insurgent groups and Sunni Militias again.

Then when the Syria civil war began, the Iraqi insurgents and Sunni Militias began supplying the Sunni groups across the border with weapons and training, and as things grew they became more directly involved notably with the group that would become ISIS as it paid well, and had objectives that suited the outcomes sought by Sunni Nationalists.

Consequently, ISIS rapidly gained access to a well trained (ex-Iraqi military, police and intelligence) force of about 15,000 or so experienced insurgents, that were well organized inside Iraq, and well established at fighting a guerilla war - allowing ISIS to tip the balance across the border regions in their favour.

It also gave the capacity to IS to understand the weaknesses of the existing Iraqi army, and rout it quickly and effectively (as the Sons had been engaged against the Iraqi military for some time, and been collecting intelligence on it).


IMO an important part of the psychological aspect is winning "hears and minds" of those not actively engaged but who might become sympathetic or already are to some degree but not engaging in violence.

The failure to do so by the US/their S. Vietnamese allies (some would say puppets) was a pertinent factor in the way things went.Some felt the British did a better job in Malaya during the "emergency" and a pretty abysmal job in Kenya.There are those who think Bloody Sunday (and ensuing investigation) and Internment were disasters in terms of the broader big picture in unnecessarily alienating "hearts and minds".

We could try introducing Sharia Law, outlawing homosexuality, take the vote away from women, allow polygamy for men only, and make Islam the state religion. Those measures would go some way to winning their hearts and minds.

 


mother-in-law is an anagram of woman hitler

legaleagle Flag 03 Jul 15 1.17am

An interesting point of view.You would have been invaluable in assisting the US with its counter-insurgency strategy in Vietnam.

 

Bert the Head Flag Epsom 03 Jul 15 7.08am

Quote martin2412 at 26 Jun 2015 1.45pm

[Link]

We have to stop fannying about. We need to get in and start wiping this scum off the earth.

Modern day Nazis, except now everyone who's not a muslim is a 'Jew'


The nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities carried out by his own side, but he has a remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them.

George Orwell, Notes on Nationalism, 1943


 

jamiemartin721 Flag Reading 03 Jul 15 9.19am

Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 4.46pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 4.01pm

Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 1.45pm

kill them

The voices in your head?


As opposed to the Boy's own Guide to Postmodern Philosophy that appears to be in yours?

It wouldn't be gender specific if it was postmodern


 


"One Nation Under God, has turned into One Nation Under the Influence of One Drug"
[Link]

jamiemartin721 Flag Reading 03 Jul 15 9.27am

Quote Jacey at 02 Jul 2015 4.23pm

Just a suggestion, but do you think the prospect of our 6 RAF jets will cause ISIL to quake in their boots, if we eventually agree to attack them in Syria, after the summer hols!!

Not at all. It'll probably strengthen their resolve unless we get extremely lucky with the targeting. I doubt IS has a command structure, as it generally consists of affiliated groups operating independently. Given that its far more likely that the Tunsia attack was not IS but an affiliate based in Libya (where the individuals most likely trained and probably was equipped), I'd imagine it'd be largely pointless.

What we should have done, is propped up the regimes of Assad and Gaddaffi, rather than associated ourselves with the rebels (and in Libya supported the rebels with air force and equipment). Groups like this florish in failed states, where they can provide sufficient force of arms and supply.


 


"One Nation Under God, has turned into One Nation Under the Influence of One Drug"
[Link]

jamiemartin721 Flag Reading 03 Jul 15 9.36am

Quote legaleagle at 02 Jul 2015 9.25pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 12.00pm

Quote TheJudge at 02 Jul 2015 11.33am

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 10.57pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 9.07pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 01 Jul 2015 4.38pm

Quote TheJudge at 01 Jul 2015 4.24pm
Most of what you say is generally reasonable but I would remind you that the IRA nearly killed the entire Cabinet and there were not really many active IRA members. A similar action would constitute a serious threat to national security I would suggest.

They didn't nearly kill the entire cabinet, they managed to bomb the Brighton Hotel and launch a rocket attack on Downing Street. Neither attack would likely have resulted in the loss of the entire cabinet, and civil contingencies exist that can deal with that event anyhow.

The number of active IRA members, doesn't really describe the effectiveness or size of the organization. The Provisionals generally had very few active service units in operation at any given time. Those cells would carry out attacks and bombings, but they were supported by other cells that dealt with this like logistical support, intelligence, counter intelligence, operational planning etc that all would then be fed to an ASU. Someone would build the bomb, another group would move it from the bomb maker to the armoury, another group would then supply it to the ASU would would deploy it, and then another group would have set up 'escape plans' for the ASU (and many of these groups would have little or no interaction) - It makes the most of skill sets and allows focused training (and in theory makes it harder to infiltrate)

So you might have three active service units on the mainland, of say 15 people in total, but they would be backed by a much larger organization.


As such an ASU was only focused on conducting the operation. Most militaries work this way, there are those that 'engage the enemy' and those who 'make it possible'.


Sounds like you wouldn't get twitchy until the IS flag was flying over Parliament. Glad you're not in charge.

Not really, I like to understand how things work and operate. I think its vital to understand an enemy, who it is, what it wants, how it functions etc if you want to defeat it. This isn't a conflict that can be won purely on a militarily basis.



No war is won by military action alone. It requires a capacity to know what the enemy is thinking and intelligence on their capabilities. It is also a psychological battle. No one should doubt that.

Military, psychological, ideological, sociological and economic. The best way to defeat an enemy is to deprive it of its capacity to fight and then its will to fight.

Interestingly one of the core foundations of ISIS (at least in Iraq) is the accumulation of a significant portion of the Sons of Iraq, who prior to the US pull out, were operating as a paid support force alongside the US troops. Many of these 'Sons' had prior Iraqi military and Police experience, and were previously involved with the anti-US Insurgency, but they also were fairly well paid by the US and turned out to be effective if somewhat unwilling allies. The US paid better than AL-Qaeda, and the Sons knew who was allied with which factions.

In 2009 the US passed all responsibility over to the Iraqi government, who promptly ceased paying the Sons of Iraqi, rendering them unemployed, and so they ended up signing up with Insurgent groups and Sunni Militias again.

Then when the Syria civil war began, the Iraqi insurgents and Sunni Militias began supplying the Sunni groups across the border with weapons and training, and as things grew they became more directly involved notably with the group that would become ISIS as it paid well, and had objectives that suited the outcomes sought by Sunni Nationalists.

Consequently, ISIS rapidly gained access to a well trained (ex-Iraqi military, police and intelligence) force of about 15,000 or so experienced insurgents, that were well organized inside Iraq, and well established at fighting a guerilla war - allowing ISIS to tip the balance across the border regions in their favour.

It also gave the capacity to IS to understand the weaknesses of the existing Iraqi army, and rout it quickly and effectively (as the Sons had been engaged against the Iraqi military for some time, and been collecting intelligence on it).


IMO an important part of the psychological aspect is winning "hears and minds" of those not actively engaged but who might become sympathetic or already are to some degree but not engaging in violence.

The failure to do so by the US/their S. Vietnamese allies (some would say puppets) was a pertinent factor in the way things went.Some felt the British did a better job in Malaya during the "emergency" and a pretty abysmal job in Kenya.There are those who think Bloody Sunday (and ensuing investigation) and Internment were disasters in terms of the broader big picture in unnecessarily alienating "hearts and minds".

I generally think that Hearts and Minds tends to be obfuscated from the reality on the ground and political agendas. Realistically the Taliban and IS aren't winning hearts and minds, but providing stability, employment and prospects. Its notable that IS has flourished in the badlands of Northern Iraq, Syria and Libya, all three countries (or in the case of Iraq regions).

A large portion of IS fight because IS pays them well enough to (ex-Iraqi military and Iraqi Sunni insurgents). The enemy of my enemy is quite a common practice in insurgencies, rebellions and civil wars.


 


"One Nation Under God, has turned into One Nation Under the Influence of One Drug"
[Link]

leggedstruggle Flag Croydon 03 Jul 15 9.48am

Quote legaleagle at 03 Jul 2015 1.17am

An interesting point of view.You would have been invaluable in assisting the US with its counter-insurgency strategy in Vietnam.

If you want to change the subject to Vietnam, they could have tried to win the hearts and minds of the communists by introducing a one-party state, gulags, the worship of Ho Chi Minh, the collectivisation of farmland (6,000 peasants massacred during a revolt), land 'reform' (at least 120,000 executed), rent 'reduction' (at least 200,000 executed).

 


mother-in-law is an anagram of woman hitler

leggedstruggle Flag Croydon 03 Jul 15 10.11am

Quote jamiemartin721 at 03 Jul 2015 9.19am

Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 4.46pm

Quote jamiemartin721 at 02 Jul 2015 4.01pm

Quote leggedstruggle at 02 Jul 2015 1.45pm

kill them

The voices in your head?


As opposed to the Boy's own Guide to Postmodern Philosophy that appears to be in yours?

It wouldn't be gender specific if it was postmodern


There is a Girl's own Guide - very similar, but leaves out the bit on how immoral it is for women to have children.

 


mother-in-law is an anagram of woman hitler

jamiemartin721 Flag Reading 03 Jul 15 10.38am

Quote leggedstruggle at 03 Jul 2015 9.48am

Quote legaleagle at 03 Jul 2015 1.17am

An interesting point of view.You would have been invaluable in assisting the US with its counter-insurgency strategy in Vietnam.

If you want to change the subject to Vietnam, they could have tried to win the hearts and minds of the communists by introducing a one-party state, gulags, the worship of Ho Chi Minh, the collectivisation of farmland (6,000 peasants massacred during a revolt), land 'reform' (at least 120,000 executed), rent 'reduction' (at least 200,000 executed).

ARVN, US and Allies caused between 420 and 1m civilian deaths. The South Vietnamese government, during the war, ordered the deaths of 50-200,000 people (the US 4-10,000 people).

Willbanks and Levy's research suggests as many as 220,000 civilian deaths were counted as 'VC casualties' rather than civilian casualties.

A result of the use of Agent Orange was nearly half a million child birth defects.

Turns out war and civil war is never nice.


 


"One Nation Under God, has turned into One Nation Under the Influence of One Drug"
[Link]

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